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Natural disasters and terrorist acts have significant potential to disrupt emergency communication systems. These emergency
communication networks include first-responder, cellular, landline, and emergency answering services such as 911, 112, or 999.
Without these essential emergency communications capabilities, search, rescue, and recovery operations during a catastrophic
event will be severely debilitated. High altitude platforms could be fitted with telecommunications equipment and used to
support these critical communications missions once the catastrophic event occurs. With the ability to be continuously on station,
HAPs provide excellent options for providing emergency coverage over high-risk areas before catastrophic incidents occur. HAPs
could also provide enhanced 911 capabilities using either GPS or reference stations. This paper proposes potential emergency
communications architecture and presents a method for estimating emergency communications systems traﬃc patterns for a
catastrophic event.
Copyright © 2008 Juan D. Deaton. This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License,
which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
1. INTRODUCTION
After Hurricane Katrina Figure 1, all forms of terrestrial
communication networks were severely debilitated. Damage
to first-responder networks caused multiple problems in
command, control, and rescue operations. Two million
landline telephones were out of service at the peak of the
crisis and New Orleans sustained a 70% cellular base station
outage. Two major carriers lost complete coverage for weeks.
Nine hundred and eleven (United States equivalent of 112)
emergency call systems became completely incapacitated
[1]. This unprecedented damage to telecommunications
networks has rejuvenated an interest in emergency telecom-
munication systems.
Due to their survivability, coverage, and capability of
being continuously on station, HAPs oﬀer an excellent alter-
native for providing emergency telecommunications after a
catastrophic incident. HAPs are an ideal option for providing
emergency coverage over high-risk areas before catastrophic
incidents occur [2]. This unique capability provides signif-
icant advantages over terrestrial-based deployable systems
and even other airborne systems. HAPs could be outfitted
to provide needed critical communications for search and
rescue, command and control, and critical infrastructure
repair. This unique service population and scenario of
use require a new mindset for understanding emergency
network requirements and traﬃc loading. Traﬃc loading
has implications to the amount of required equipment and
subsequent impacts to the payload of an HAP.
Evolving cellular technologies and first-responder com-
munication systems each have their separate technology
nuances, economic models, and interoperability issues.
Emergency systems for cellular networks should provide
private access to key personnel as well as emergency call
capabilities to the general populace. This has implications
for special network congestion control, special location
determining capabilities, and access management methods
and policies. By examining the specific disaster events,
it is possible to begin to extrapolate necessary data for
consideration of an emergency communications network.
Alternatively, terrestrial assets should not be ignored
when considering communications reconstitution. Deploy-
able cellular systems called Cell on Wheels (COWs) or
Cell on Light Truck (COLT) can be deployed by carriers
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or government support agencies in the event of a disaster.
Unfortunately, these systems take time to be transported
to the disaster scene and may not have access into disaster
areas. Although, COWs and COLTs can provide capacity
and coverage similar to a quotidian cellular system, both
HAPs and deployable terrestrial systems have timeframes or
windows around the disaster incident in which they are each
most eﬀective.
2. NEEDED CRITICAL COMMUNICATIONS
According to the Bipartisan Committee Investigation of
Response to Hurricane Katrina, critical communications
needed during Hurricane Katrina could be grouped into
these three categories [1].
(1) First-responder communications
Enhanced 911, Emergency Responders, Army, National
Guard, and Coast Guard.
(2) Command and control
Situational awareness, supply delivery, coordination of res-
cue and security forces, and transportation of evacuees.
(3) Critical infrastructure restoration
Clearing debris and restoring power and communication
networks.
Interoperable communication between first responders
is important. However, without knowledge of citizens in
distress, it makes their function problematic. This is why
one paramount element in first-responder communications
in the United States is Enhanced 911 (E911). E911 provides
location information of an emergency call to first responders.
Without connecting the first responders, dispatch functions
and the citizens, a surfeit of manpower, can be wasted
with ineﬃcient searches. Additionally, the many eyes and
ears of the local citizens can greatly enhance the situational
awareness of the on-scene commander.
Commanders and state oﬃcers also need accurate situa-
tional awareness during a catastrophic event to make eﬀective
decisions. During Hurricane Katrina, reports from the media
were used to determine situational awareness. These reports
were grossly exaggerated and unreliable, as was evidenced
from reports made about the Superdome [1]. E911 call
location data points along with Public Safety Answer Points
(PSAP) voice streams used in an Emergency Operations
Center (EOC) could also be invaluable to commands to
determine where to focus rescue eﬀorts, deploy security
forces, and manage evacuees.
In addition to search, rescue, and relief eﬀorts, critical
infrastructure must be restored so that water, roads, and
communications can be made available. Personnel executing
this mission also require communications after a catas-
trophic event.
3. EMERGENCY HAP ARCHITECTURE AND
CAPABILITIES
For an emergency HAP platform to be the most eﬀective, it is
paramount that its capabilities are integrated into complete
emergency communications architecture. The cellular com-
munications available must be representative of the existing
wireless ecosystems so that existing devices can communicate
with the platform. All communications capabilities on the
HAP should be interoperable using gateways and an IP core
to allow communications between all networks.
This would require IP gateways that could manage
interoperable traﬃc between systems. Additionally, a Voice
over IP (VoIP) server would be required as part of the server
to enable these communications. Most likely, this would be
based on Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) signaling. Real-
time Transfer Protocol (RTP) streams would be created
between communicating points over the IP core. Currently,
this technique is being widely used by public safety and
military to create interoperable networks [4, 5].
Additionally, E911 capabilities should be leveraged to
assist in disaster relief eﬀorts. Backhaul is also required
either to terrestrial receiving stations or through satellite, to
transmit voice and data information into and out of the HAP.
Integration with PSAP systems and the Emergency Oper-
ations Center (EOC) is important for maximum benefits.
Figure 2 shows an example diagram of this architecture.
3.1. Cellular technologies on HAPs
Cellular systems form the basis for E911 functionality as
well as an additional communications capability for first
responders. Because in the United States, Global System
for Mobile (GSM) and Code Division Multiple Access
(CDMA, to include IS-95 and 1X) cellular technologies make
up almost equal market share and it is likely that these
technologies will be used for the next 5–10 years, both
systems should be used for emergency calls [6, 7]. In contrast,
82% of the rest of the world rely primarily on GSM and HAPs
in almost any other part of the world could rely on a GSM
cellular system only [8].
There are limitations with using cellular technologies at
high altitudes. Due to channelization via time slots, GSM
time guard bands limit link length to 35 km limiting possible
coverage areas. The link length could be increased by increas-
ing the time guard bands, but this would come at a cost of
capacity to the system [9]. Additionally, interference onto
functioning commercial systems is problematic with GSM
due to the deployment of Absolute Radio Frequency Channel
Numbers throughout the network. CDMA and Universal
Mobile Telecommunications systems have fewer issues with
interference due to their use of spread spectrum techniques
and channelization via orthogonal codes. Regardless of the
cellular system, special network configurations are needed to
insure that time out scenarios do not occur due to long link
lengths and that spectrum licensing is always an issue unless
the license owner is deploying the HAP [10].
In terms of proven HAP cellular experiments, CDMA
1x and UMTS cellular communications have been demon-
strated at altitudes of 20 km [10, 11]. These experiments
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Figure 2: Potential emergency HAP architecture.
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show that the promise of HAP-based cellular communica-
tions is a real possibility for spread spectrum technologies.
It also highlights opportunities for experimentation using
GSM systems on HAP platforms. Especially since, most of
the world relies on GSM technology.
3.1.1. Priority and emergency calls
Regardless of the technology, cellular systems deployed on an
HAP should be configured for special access profiles. These
profiles should allow for two specific groups: private network
access and emergency calls.
Private access to the cellular network could be given
to those who require critical communications by creating
a special home location register (HLR). This HLR could
exist on the HAP. However, it could also reside in a
terrestrial location and be connected to the public switched
telephone network (PSTN). If standalone cellular systems
were deployed on the HAP, messaging to authorize users
from the centralized HLR would be done via the satellite link
to the PSTN. The authorized mobiles will detect the carrier
cellular and be able to roam onto the network.
With regards to emergency calls, most mobile devices will
go into an SOS mode once they enter a cellular network
that they are unauthorized to use. This means that the
mobile is only allowed to make emergency calls. If an
emergency cellular network is deployed, mobile devices
should automatically enter into the SOS mode and therefore
only be able to make emergency calls. Although this is a
desired behavior, it does have a disadvantage. Mobiles would
not be able to send and receive SMS messages. However,
mobiles could receive cell broadcast messages for warnings,
evacuation routes, and so forth, if widespread messages
needed to be distributed.
3.2. Options for first-responder systems
Due to the disparity between first-responders radio systems,
a replacement communications system that utilizes existing
first-responder devices is very problematic. Any solution to
this problem has drawbacks in critical deployment time,
capacity, and network cost. The following are options for a
responder system replacement after a catastrophic event.
3.2.1. Radio handout
If an HAP was used to respond to a catastrophic incident with
first-responder communications, radios could be handed out
to those who needed interoperable communications. This
would require a cache of radios with a generic preconfigura-
tion to be available and handed out to first responders upon
the event of the incident. Using a P25 or TETRA complaint
system would seem to be the least common denominator
in a variety of independent first-responder communication
systems. If first responders do not already have compatible
radios, it is possible that critical time could be lost due to the
logistics of the phone handout.
3.2.2. Audio gateway
Audio gateways provide an option for establishing connec-
tions between disparate communications by allowing devices
of separate system and frequency types to communicate
together. This technology is often used for emergency
communications to enable interoperable communications
between agencies. Figure 2 shows an example of a gateway
that allows for three diﬀerent communications networks to
communicate with each other [12]. Audio gateways provide
the most flexible option for first-responder communications.
Gateways enable dynamic creation of talk groups between
diﬀerent systems and can be used as configurable repeaters
when deployed. These systems however do come at a price of
time to configure the system and reduced capacity.
3.2.3. SDR systems
Software-defined radio (SDR) provides a theoretical solution
to interoperability by dynamically controlling operating
frequency and radio link protocols through software. Using
an SDR platform on board, the HAP could enable the
first-responder radio system to be dynamically recreated on
the HAP. Ideally, this system would listen to transmitting
frequencies and tune antennas to the appropriate frequen-
cies, then enable recoding of existing air interface protocols
such that the devices could communicate again. Utilizing
existing devices with SDR could be the fastest option for
interoperable communication using an airborne platform.
However, the major drawback of this system is cost.
4. METHODS TO MANAGE EMERGENCY CALL TRAFFIC
AND UTILIZE EMERGENCY CALL DATA
In order to quantify potential Erlang load on an emergency
response HAP, data was combined from various sources
in order to estimate emergency call volumes and traﬃc
patterns. Emergency calls were estimated to be 30 seconds
long and emergency call trends were estimated by using
information from emergency call patterns from the 2006
Israeli-Hezbollah conflict [13]. These trends were normal-
ized and then applied to a worst-case emergency scenario,
an improvised nuclear device [14]. The improvised nuclear
device scenario estimated the population of evacuated and
displaced persons who would require an emergency call.
Using the population estimate from the improvised nuclear
device scenario and emergency call patterns, Figure 4 was
derived. In this estimate, each user was assumed to make only
one emergency call.
Although the call volume for emergency calls is very
high, the Erlang contributions from the emergency calls are
very low. This is because each call was assumed to be 30
seconds long and measured over a 24-hour time period.
On day one, 80 000 calls were made, each was 30 seconds
long, contributing to a total of 2 400 000 call seconds. When
measured over a 24-hour time period, this is 28 Erlang. Given
these high call volumes and Erlang load, the requirements
for cellular equipment are not as limiting as the need for an
automated answering service or more emergency operators.
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Figure 4: Estimated worst-case emergency call volumes.
This is due to the fact that the number of calls is so very high
and Erlang contributions are very small.
To handle the high call volume, an emergency autoserver
would be required to provide an automatic emergency
answering capability. Once the mobile device detects the
HAP cellular network and the user dials the emergency
number, the mobile device could then enter an interrogation
mode to determine the location, type of incident, and
severity. When the phone has its interrogation, it could send
an SMS to the emergency autoserver. This server could also
use this information to properly direct first responders to the
incident, to triage the calls, and to report the high severity
calls to the PSAP operators for call back.
This method could significantly reduce air interface
resources for determining incidents and locations of emer-
gency calls, but more importantly, reduce the need for
emergency operators. However, it would also require phones
to have a new application and unique network configuration
to perform this function. The users should only be allowed
to send an SMS to a specific device and be able to receive
calls if required. Current SOS modes on mobile devices do
not support these functions.
Using E911 location data and real-time voice feed from
emergency callers could also provide accurate situational
awareness at the EOC. This information would be used
to assist commanders and civil oﬃcers who need to have
situational awareness for coordination of security and rescue
forces. Additionally, this information would be especially
useful if overlaid on real-time geospatial imagery. Using
this technique, emergency calls could be tracked on a map
allowing commanders to “zoom in” to see the disaster, and
then dispatch forces appropriately. With PSAP data fed into
the EOC, commands would be able to make better decisions
based on discrete data points and legitimate situational
awareness.
5. E911 TECHNIQUES USING AN HAP
For emergency calls, the HAP should provide E911 location
capabilities to facilitate search and rescue operations. Mobile
location methods are diﬀerent for CDMA and GSM systems.
3GPP Release 99 standards support assisted GPS for UMTS,
in the United States CDMA operators also use A-GPS tech-
nologies, while GSM operators use a triangulation technique
to locate the mobile [13]. Unfortunately, GSM techniques
require two- or three-cell sites to accurately locate a mobile.
Using HAPs to locate mobile devices does present diﬀerent
scenarios since HAPs could be moving.
One potential method is combing the onboard navi-
gation with position determining equipment (PDE) which
can calculate the angle of arrival (AOA) and the time delay
of arrival (TDOA). This allows the HAP to determine the
location of the mobile device with respect to the HAP. Good
station keeping would make HAPs an ideal platform to
perform this operation. Basic diagram of this technique is
shown in Figure 5.
Another option for locating mobiles was tested by Japan’s
National Institute of Information and Communications
Technology (NiCT), the objective of the test was to use
reference stations, which locations are known, to calibrate
the AOA sensors on the aircraft. An example of this
technique is shown in Figure 6. These sensors then took
AOA measurements from the target station that was used
to calculate its location relative to the reference stations.
Using this technique, the NiCT was able to accurately
calculate the location of target stations within 5 m [15].
This technique could use operational cellular cell sites or
deployable reference stations for reference AOAs. Due to
their altitude, HAPs could receive signals from reference
stations very far way, out of the disaster area. As an example,
a separate NiCT experiment using an HAP at 20 km could
receive signals from another transmitting station 200 km
away [10].
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Figure 7: Estimated system load and BTS.
6. MAXIMUM CALL LOADING ESTIMATES FOR
EMERGENCY TELECOMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM
In order to quantify the communications needed to support
a disaster scenario, an understanding of the population size
and traﬃc patterns are necessary. Figure 7 shows a maximum
estimated traﬃc pattern based on user population data and
outage periods during Hurricane Katrina [1, 16]. These
estimations are a best eﬀort in beginning to understanding
the nuances of catastrophic disaster emergency scenario.
Figure 7, left Y-axis, represents Erlangs. The total maximum
estimated usage line is the summation of priority user traﬃc
and emergency calls.
Priority user traﬃc was estimated from total populations
of military, first responders, and public utility which served
during Hurricane Katrina [1, 17]. Out of the daily mili-
tary population, the number of commanding oﬃcers was
estimated and each was assumed to need a mobile device.
Since daily populations of first responders and public utility
workers were unavailable, a total population estimate of
15 000 was used and 50% were estimated to need a mobile
device. All users were given a conservative 0.2 Erlang. Then
total Erlang usage was then calculated.
Figure 7, right Y-axis, represents the percentile of cell
sites in service. The solid line shows the actual and estimated
amount of cell sites in service after Hurricane Katrina. Cell
site outage data is not available for the two-week period
immediately following the Hurricane. As a result, a worst-
case scenario was assumed and the data was interpolated.
Regardless, it is evident from the first given data point (two
weeks after the Hurricane) that the cell outage of ∼70% is
extremely severe. Following the initial data point for another
two weeks, the networks continuously suﬀered high outages.
Figure 7 reveals important information with regard to
large-scale disasters. First and most obvious is the need for
emergency communications immediately after the disaster
and an ideal placement for a continuously on station
HAP. Second, catastrophic events will have persistency on
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Figure 8: Eﬀective disaster response windows.
telecommunications networks. Large-scale network outages
could be expected to last weeks or even months. Third, traﬃc
estimations show an immediate need for emergency calling
capabilities and a capability to support a significant amount
of users on a private network.
7. EFFECTIVE TIME FRAMES FOR HAP EMERGENCY
SYSTEM AND TERRESTRIAL ASSETS
A complete coverage strategy between deployable terrestrial
assets and the HAP is important since use of HAP will be
most eﬀective up to two weeks after the disaster occurs.
This is due to the following reasons. First, emergencies after
disasters require immediate attention in order to minimize
loss of life. Second, the average maximum standby battery
life of a mobile device will last ∼300 hours [18, 19]. Third,
it is highly unlikely that terrestrial assets will be unable to
access areas due to the hazards caused by the catastrophic
event. Inaccessible areas could result from natural hazards,
debris, or security issues.
Following this initial HAP window, there will be a period
where both the terrestrial assets and the HAP could be
simultaneously deployed in time. Also at this time, evacuees
will be moved into recovery areas where terrestrial assets
can be deployed. However, the HAP capability could still
be used in areas where search eﬀorts and infrastructure
restoration eﬀorts are occurring. This overall process would
require coordination between various diﬀerent government
and commercial agencies to insure that coverage areas are
provided equitably and without redundancy. Figure 8 shows
the HAP and terrestrial eﬀectiveness windows pictorially.
7.1. Traffic sizing
Within the HAP eﬀectiveness window (see Figure 8), a daily
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Figure 10: Continuous rescue.
the daily maximum traﬃc and estimated the hourly call
trends, it is possible to determine the number of needed
simultaneous channels needed for the emergency response
system. There are two assumptions that can be used for
daily traﬃc patterns. The first assumes that daylight search
and rescue eﬀorts. The second assumes a continuous rescue
eﬀort. In the daylight rescue case, call traﬃc patterns will
likely be very similar to normal patterns but shifted in time.
Using 4200 daily Erlangs load and applying a normalized
high traﬃc day with hourly trend shifted in time, Figure 9
can be derived. From this estimate, the standard Erlang
B table can then be used to calculate the number of
simultaneous channels needed to support the hourly peak
with grade of service of 1%. This yields ≈ 350 simultaneous
channels. In the continuous rescue case, 8-hour rescue shifts
were assumed and a normalized traﬃc curve was estimated.
Using this estimate and amount of total daily traﬃc, this
yields Figure 10 [20]. Based on this call load model, the
estimated Erlang peak was 187 Erlang which yields 207
simultaneous channels needed from the Erlang B table.
In discussions with integrators of the deployable cellular
systems used by federal agencies, a payload of≈ 500 kg could
support 300 simultaneous CDMA 1x cellular channels using
commercial oﬀ-the-shelf equipment [21].
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8. CONCLUSIONS
HAPs provide an excellent option for emergency commu-
nications. Their survivability during a disaster and ability
to be continuously on-station oﬀer an ideal solution for an
emergency communications capability. However, the nature
of providing emergency communications still provides
unique challenges. CDMA-based cellular communications
have fewer diﬃculties deployed than TDMA-based systems,
and recovering first-responder systems is problematic at
best. Additionally, GSM E911 capabilities are also more
diﬃcult to implement on an HAP. Due to the high volume
of emergency calls, an automated scheme is required to
answer and manage the calls. This will require more
experimentation and development. Understanding the traﬃc
patterns of an emergency communications system is diﬃcult
due to the availability of data and requires many estimates.
Estimates given here were worst-case scenarios; however,
more research is required with more detailed data and/or
simulations to understand more about the behavior of
emergency traﬃc patterns. These traﬃc patterns have a direct
impact on equipment needed and payload of the emergency
communications platform. Despite these diﬃculties, the
events of Hurricane Katrina have made us more aware of
the requirements for providing emergency communications
where HAPs provide an excellent platform alternative for
emergency communications and assist in saving lives.
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